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CONSUMER CHOICE IN THE AUTO INSURANCE MARKET
JEFFREY O'CONNELL,* STEPHEN CARROLL,** MICHAEL
HOROWITZ*** & ALLAN ABRAHAMSE****
John Garamendi, California's powerful insurance commissioner, sur-
prised his staff one day by declaring that henceforth, "no-fault" in-
surance would be called "personal-protection " insurance in his office.
"What's the difference?" asked an aide at a staff meeting. "About a
million votes, "replied Walter Zelman, a Garamendi deputy.'
I. THE PRESENT SITUATION
It was the often-acknowledged-and even arguably horren-
dous-inadequacy of traditional tort liability as applied to personal
injury suffered in automobile accidents2 that led to the enactment of
no-fault insurance laws in many states.3 Why has no-fault liability
also-at least in the eyes of many-earned a bad name? And, more
importantly, what kind of new reform can we effect to free us from
the inadequacies of both tort law and no-fault laws?
In 1991, the RAND Corporation published an appraisal of no-
fault laws, being careful to make clear that RAND itself neither sup-
ported nor opposed no-fault reforms.4 As the summary of the
RAND study noted, disputes about auto insurance continue to ex-
cite debate.5 Critics of the tort system insist that its costs are too
high and that its payments are "inefficient, inequitable, and slow" in
* The Samuel H. McCoy II Professor of Law, University of Virginia; B.A.,
Dartmouth College; J.D., Harvard University.
** Senior Economist, RAND; B.S., M.S., Illinois Institute of Technology; Ph.D.,
Johns Hopkins University.
*** Senior Fellow and Director, Judicial Studies Program, Manhattan Institute; B.A.,
City University of New York; J.D., Yale University.
**** Mathematician, RAND; B.S., Ph.D., University of Michigan.
1. Stephen K. Yoder, Insurance Regulator in California 11oos Voters, Bashes Firms, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 10, 1992, at 1.
2. See, e.g., infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
3. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., No-FAULT APPROACHES TO COMPENSATING PEOPLE
INJURED IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS 7-9 (RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1991). "Fif-
teen states," stated RAND in 1991, "now have a no-fault plan that includes some form
of tort threshold that limits access to the liability system." Id. But see infra note 22.
4. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL & JAMES S. KAKALIK, NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE:
A POLICY PERSPECTIVE (RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1991).
5. Id. at vii.
1016
COMPENSATION SYSTEMS SYMPOSIUM
compensating injured people.6 But critics of no-fault laws rebut
that the systems that replaced fault-based payments with PIP pay-
ments 7 infringed upon fundamental legal rights of victims to re-
cover both economic and non-economic-principally pain and
suffering-losses from those injuring them, and in any event failed
to hold down the costs of automobile insurance.' In trying to help
resolve these opposing views, the RAND report asked the following
questions about the effects of adopting a PIP system:
(1) What would be the effect of a PIP system on (a) the costs of
compensation, (b) transaction costs, principally for lawyers' fees and
other costs of claim processing, (c) "the adequacy and equity" of
compensation, and (d) promptness of compensation?9
(2) How would variations in the design of PIP programs affect
the answers to the above questions?' 0
(3) What would be the resultant variations between states?"
The RAND study concluded:
* A PIP system either can produce substantial savings over the
fault-based system or it can increase costs, depending both on the
plan's design and on differences among states that affect auto insur-
ance costs. 2 For example, the level of PIP benefits, the nature and
size of barriers to pursuit of tort claims for pain and suffering, and
the litigious nature of a state's population will all factor into the cost
equation.
* PIP plans reduce transaction costs.' 3
* Compensation under PIP plans more closely matches compensa-
tion with economic losses-principally medical costs and wage
losses. ' 4
* Present PIP laws eliminate compensation for non-economic
losses-principally pain and suffering-but only for less serious
injuries. 1"
* Compensation is more prompt under PIP coverage.' 6
6. Id.
7. Insurance payments that do not take account of fault are usually termed personal
injury protection or personal protection insurance payments, in either case commonly
nicknamed "PIP."
8. CARROLL & KAKALIK, supra note 4, at vii.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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The RAND study closed its summary by indicating to policy-
makers that, in choosing between the traditional tort system and PIP
alternatives, they must face difficult trade-offs as to "whether to cut
costs or to preserve or increase compensation for injured people,
and what balance to seek between compensation for economic and
for noneconomic losses.' ' 7
In the main body of its report, RAND examined the effects of
four PIP plans broadly representative of current laws.' 8 Two of the
plans studied have what are termed "strong verbal thresholds" simi-
lar to those found in Florida, Michigan, and New York.' 9 Under a
strong verbal threshold, traffic victims can seek payment for non-
economic losses only if they suffer statutorily defined serious inju-
ries. For example, strong verbal thresholds always include
"death," 2 but may also include such injury thresholds as "signifi-
cant and permanent loss of an important bodily function," "perma-
nent serious disfigurement," or "permanent consequential
limitation of use of a function or system. '"21 The other two plans
RAND examined have a $5,000 threshold that blocks traffic victims
from seeking compensation for non-economic losses unless their
medical losses exceed the statutory threshold.22 Thereafter, RAND
matched a $5,000 threshold with a PIP benefit level of (a) $15,000,
and (b) $50,000. All four plans assumed no deductible against PIP
benefits nor any deduction for collateral sources.23 The results
were presented in a table, reprinted below.
Table 1 shows the estimated cost reductions caused by verbal
and monetary thresholds and different PIP benefit levels. The
above reductions are not in total premiums, but rather only in some
of the costs going to make up total premiums. For example, we esti-
mate that costs of paying losses constitute approximately three-
quarters of automobile insurance premiums,2 4 and costs of paying
17. Id.
18. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 29-39.
19. Id. at 29.
20. Id. at 6 n.14.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 29. Monetary thresholds around the country varied as of 1991 from a low
of $400 in Connecticut's plan to a high of $7,600 in Hawaii's plan. Id. at 6 n. 15, 29 n. 1.
In July 1993, Connecticut repealed its no-fault law. See Mark Mazniokas & Larry Wil-
liams, 'leiker Signs Repeal of No-fault Insurance Law, HARTFORD COURANT, July 2, 1992, at
dl.
23. Id. at 29 & n.3. But see infra text accompanying note 64.
24. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, The Executive Letter: Special Report-ll'here the
Auto Insurance Dollar Goes, Sept. 9, 1991, at 2 [hereinafter INSURANCE INSTITUTE]. In ef-
fect, such costs of paying losses are the equivalent of "pure premium." See infra note 28.
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TABLE 1
EFFECTS OF THRESHOLD AND PIP BENEFIT LEVEL ON
COSTS AND COMPENSATION
Threshold/PIP Benefit:
Strong Verbal $5,000
$15,000 $50,000 $15,000 $50,000
Percent change in:
Total injury coverage costs -22 - 12 -14 - 6
Transaction costs -39 -38 -30 -29
Net Compensation 
-13 + 1 - 7 + 6
for personal injury in turn constitute approximately one-half of total
payment costs, including all payment for collision insurance and
property damage liability costs.2 5
Again, all the plans RAND examined in Table 1 preserve full-
scale tort claims for unreimbursed economic as well as for non-eco-
nomic losses above the pertinent threshold. At the urging of Pro-
fessor O'Connell, RAND also examined the effect of eliminating tort
claims for non-economic losses above the threshold-which no cur-
rent state no-fault insurance law does.2 6 The need for this estimate
was prompted by the results of a study produced by the Alliance of
American Insurers, a trade association of mostly mutual insurers.
The study indicated the relatively low cost of high PIP benefits,
compared to total personal injury costs, even in states with strong
verbal thresholds.27 New York's $50,000 of PIP benefits, for exam-
ple, contributed only 36 percent of the total pure premium for per-
sonal injury in 1987.28 In other words, the relatively few tort claims
preserved over New York's strong verbal threshold-about fifteen
percent-contribute disproportionately to total costs. 29 Further-
more, RAND estimated that on a nationwide basis almost half of the
personal injury pure premium would go for non-economic losses,
25. INSURANCE INSTITUTE, supra note 24, at 2. See also infra note 53 and accompany-
ing text.
26. See infra Appendix I.
27. See Jeffrey O'Connell, No-Fault Auto Insurance: Back by Popular (Market) Demand?,
26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 993, 998 tbl. 15 (1989). See infra Appendix 1 for results in other
states from the same source.
28. Id. at 997. Pure premium is that portion of premium used only to pay losses. It
thus excludes an insurer's marketing, administrative, and legal defense costs.
29. Id.
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even in states with high PIP benefits and a high threshold.3 0
To test the effects of thus eliminating claims for non-economic
loss above a variety of thresholds, RAND included in its study the
cost effects of such proposals in Table 2,"1 which is presented be-
low.
TABLE 2
EFFECTS OF THRESHOLD AND PIP BENEFIT LEVEL ON
COSTS AND COMPENSATION
Strong Strong Absolute Absolute
Threshold: $1,000 $1,000 Verbal Verbal Ban Ban
PIP Benefit $15,000 $250,000 $15,000 $250,000 $50,000 Unlimited
Percent change in:
Total injury
coverage costs -12 +13 -22 + 5 -52 -29
Transaction costs -27 -22 -39 -34 -83 -80
Net Compensation - 5 +31 -13 +24 -36 - 4
The first four columns demonstrate the effects of plans combin-
ing PIP benefits with the right to claim in tort for unreimbursed eco-
nomic losses and for non-economic losses above the specified
monetary or verbal threshold. The first column shows the effects of
a $1,000 threshold and a fairly low PIP benefit of $15,000, while the
second column shows the effects of combining the same threshold
with a very high PIP benefit level of $250,000. (According to
RAND, "less than 1% of the people injured in auto accidents had
medical costs in excess of $250,000.1132) The third and fourth col-
umns follow the same PIP benefit pattern, but with barriers to any
suits unless strong verbal thresholds are breached.
The fifth and sixth columns, however, show the cost effects of
plans that allow for no payment at all for non-economic loss-the
fifth column with a $50,000 PIP benefit, and the sixth column with
unlimited PIP benefits. RAND assumed that persons incurring eco-
30. Nationally, payment for non-economic loss would contribute 76% to the total
cost of paying for both economic and non-economic losses above a strong verbal thresh-
old like New York's with, as in New York, PIP benefits of $50,000. Thus,just about half
of the pure premium would go for non-economic losses (100 - 36 = .64 X .76 =
.486). CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 75 tbl. G. 3.1, 1.2 ($4239 x .37 = $1568; $1568
- $2052 = .76).
31. Id. at 32, tbl. 4.
32. Id. at 32.
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nomic losses in excess of the $50,000 PIP benefit level in column
five could seek compensation for their unreimbursed economic losses
exceeding $50,000-that is, through a traditional tort claim.33 By
definition, there would be no unreimbursed economic losses in col-
umn six due to its assumption of "unlimited" coverage of economic
losses. What is striking in columns five and six is that very high PIP
benefits can be combined with substantial reductions in total costs.
In addition to the large potential savings from eliminating the
high costs of preserving tort claims for non-economic losses above a
threshold, the substantial savings and relative stabilization of rates
from eliminating smaller claims for non-economic loss-which some
existing no-fault laws already realize-must be taken into account.
In this connection, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company has reviewed
its automobile insurance costs in two states-California and New
York.
These two states are similar in many respects. They
have large urban populations which have easy access to so-
phisticated (and expensive) medical and legal services. In
terms of Property Damage frequency, New York is slightly
higher than California owing, perhaps, to the fact that New
York is somewhat more densely populated. The major dif-
ference between these two states is that New York has a
verbal threshold no-fault law while California has the tradi-
tional tort-liability system. The graph below compares the
bodily injury [BI] liability claims to property damage [PD]
[liability] ratios for New York and California. In 1989, there
were 56 bodily injury claims in California versus 11 for New York
for every 100 property damage claims.
33. Id.
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In California (where lawsuits are allowed for all injuries)
the bodily injury claim pattern is climbing and no end is in
sight. The lower claim patterns in New York (where law-
suits are allowed only for "serious" injuries) are clearly evi-
dent and reflected in the liability rates charged by Liberty
Mutual and the rest of the industry. In spite of the fact that
the true accident frequency is higher in New York and that
New York includes a minimum of $50,000 in no-fault bene-
fits, the Liberty Mutual's average liability rate for the first
half of 1989 was $405 in New York [including no-fault ben-
efits] compared to $550 for California, a difference of $145
per car. Similar differentials are found in the rates of other
34carriers.
These recent pronounced increases in frequency of claims for
personal injury are all the more dramatic for having occurred while
the rate of personal injury from auto accidents has been drastically
declining. Recent years have seen (1) safer cars, containing collapsi-
ble steering wheels, padded dashboards, energy-absorbing fronts,
and air bags, (2) massive education and law-enforcement campaigns
against drunk driving, and (3) state laws mandating-and achieving
much higher rates of-use of seat belts and child-restraint devices.
Since the late 1960s, with the onset of more sophisticated and ener-
getic programs of traffic safety, traffic fatalities have dropped re-
34. John B. Conners, No-Fault 10-11 (Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., Boston, Mass.,
1991) (emphasis added).
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markably.3 ' During the 1980s, fatality frequency dropped by thirty-
eight percent, from 3.35 per 100 million miles in 1980 to 2.07 in
1990,36 thus making the dramatic contemporaneous increase in
claim frequency all the more anomalous and troublesome.
Further indication of the swelling phenomenon of personal in-
jury claims from auto accidents when unrestrained by the elimina-
tion of tort suits is reflected in data from a single state-
Pennsylvania.
[The table below] shows the BI and PD claim experience
for selected territories in Pennsylvania for the years 1985-
1987 combined. In Philadelphia, the BI claim frequency
was 2.98 claims per 100 insured cars for the central city
and [2.59] for the semi-suburban area. In contrast, the BI
claim frequency was just 0.73 in Pittsburgh and 0.46 to
0.56 in Harrisburg. The PD claim frequencies for these
territories varied moderately, from 3.50 in Harrisburg to
3.98 and 4.3 in [Philadelphia to 4.62 in Pittsburgh. Be-
cause of these widely different BI claim frequencies, the
number of BI claims for every 100 PD claims also differed.
In Philadelphia, there were 75 BI claims for every 100 PD claims.]
Yet, in Pittsburgh there were 15. 7 BI claims for every 100 PD
claims and in Harrisburg only about 13 BI claims per 100 PD
claims. BI claims were four to five times more frequent rel-
ative to PD claims in Philadelphia than in Pittsburgh or
Harrisburg.3 7
Similar, if somewhat less sensational, results exist in other states as
well.38
What this indicates is how a state like New York has greatly alle-
viated the problem of high costs for smaller tort claims while not
dealing with the problem of larger tort claims,3 9 and that the key to
the latter would be the elimination of claims for non-economic dam-
35. See, e.g., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE U.S. 609 (112th ed. 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Statistical Abstract]; Daniel
Popes, The Fraud Tax: The Cost of Hidden Conruption in Amnerican s Tort Law, LEGAL BACK-
GROUNDER (Wash. Legal. Found., Wash., D.C.) Mar. 27, 1992, at 1.
36. See 1992 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT at 610; TRENDS IN AUTO BODILY INJURY CLAIMS
(Insurance Research Council, Oak Brook, Il.), Nov. 1990, at I I [hereinafter TRENDS].
37. TRENDS, supra note 36, at 17-18 (emphasis added). The second bracketed mate-
rial was inadvertently omitted from the published text. Communication to Jeffrey
O'Connell from The Insurance Research Council (Jan. 22, 1993) (on file with author).
38. See TRENDS, supra note 36, passit.
39. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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BI AND PD CLAIM FREQUENCIES FOR PHILADELPHIA,
AND HARRISBURG
PITrSBURGH
Number of
BI Claim PH Claim BI Claims Per
Territory Frequency Frequency 100 PD Claims
Philadelphia
(01) 2.98 3.98 75.0
(14) 2.59 4.30 60.1
Pittsburgh
(03) 0.73 4.62 15.7
Harrisburg
(07) 0.50 3.94 12.7
(23) 0.46 3.50 13.1
(25) 0.56 4.14 13.5
State Average 0.83 3.95 20.9
Definition of Territories:
01 Philadelphia
03 Pittsburgh
07 Harrisburg
14 Philadelphia Semi-Suburban
23 Adams, Franklin, Snyder and Union Counties, remainder of
Lancaster, Lebanon and York County, etc.
25 Southern Daupain County
Notes: (1) Claim frequency is the number of claims per 100 insured cars.
(2) Data are for 1985-1987 combined.
Source: NAII* Automobile Compilation (1988).
* National Association of Independent Insurers.
ages in both more serious as well as less serious cases.4"
In this connection, however, there are practical political difficul-
ties when a statute completely cuts off individual tort rights-par-
ticularly when very serious injuries have occurred-while
correspondingly capping the amount of PIP benefits available to
claimants. New York, with its relatively high though limited PIP
benefits of $50,000, bowed to this consideration by preserving tort
claims above its threshold-but with the costly results mentioned
40. Although RAND itself takes no stand as to the merits of such a proposal, propo-
nents of reform could arguably point to RAND data in support of it. See sipra text ac-
companying note 31.
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COMPENSATION SYSTEMS SYMPOSIUM
above. Robert E. Keeton, co-author of the original no-fault insur-
ance draft bill, explained the problem this way:
To whatever extent provisions for compensation [pay-
able without regard to fault] fall short of assuring every vic-
tim full compensation at least for out-of-pocket loss, the
[reform] system fails to assure distribution of loss-that is,
it fails to spread it among a large group and instead leaves
it to be borne by an individual. To this extent, the system
must still confront the argument that as between just two
individuals-an innocent victim and a blameworthy
driver-it seems unfair to make the victim bear the loss.
To escape this argument and its basic appeal to one's sense
of what is fair, a pure non-fault system [eliminating all tort
claims] must come at least very close to compensating fully
for all out-of-pocket loss. But no non-fault system has yet
offered that much to victims. The reason, it would seem, is
cost. Thus, a pure non-fault system that pays full compen-
sation costs too much, and one that falls far short of full
compensation at least for out-of-pocket losses is too
inequitable.4 '
In answer to this, the RAND figures in column 6 of Table 2
indicate the feasibility of providing unlimited PIP benefits for eco-
nomic loss coupled with a ban on non-economic losses. 42 The data
make it clear that, despite such very high benefits, the savings in bod-
ily injury compensation costs would be about twenty-nine percent,
which would arguably translate into about fifteen percent savings in
total auto premiums, including the premium components for both
bodily injury and all car damage.4 3 It can perhaps be argued,
though, that such savings may not be substantial enough to mandate
by statute that everyone completely give up tort claims for non-eco-
nomic loss.
41. ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAv 136
(1969). See also Jeffrey O'Connell & Robert H. Joost, Giving .Motorists .A Choice Between
Fault and No-Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REV. 61, 64 (1986) (noting that a strong no-fault
law should balance the amount of no-fault benefits paid and the degree of restrictions
on tort damages).
42. See supra text accompanying note 31.
43. See supra text accompanying note 25. See also CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 41
(noting that the savings in total premiums is an estimate because of the fluctuation of
various factors, including the underlying distributions of injuries and the amounts of
losses and compensation, that affect the total injury coverage costs).
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II. THE PROPOSED CHOICE SYSTEM
One possible answer examined here is a reform that replaces
no-fault proposals, burdened as they are with expensive-and ar-
guably even subsidized 44 -claims for non-economic loss, while also
providing for automatic payment for economic loss. Such a new
type of reform could give motorists the option of forgoing claims for
non-economic loss, without forcing them to do so. That theory led,
in turn, to a proposal by the Bush administration for a federal stat-
ute providing in substance as follows: Motorists would be given the
option of purchasing PIP coverages at financial responsibility levels
required by state law for liability for personal injury-for example,
$20,000 in Illinois.45 Persons electing such PIP coverage could
neither sue nor be sued for pain-and-suffering damages in an auto
accident, regardless of whether the other motorist had elected PIP
coverage. But such PIP motorists could claim in tort against other
motorists, whether covered by PIP or not, for economic loss in ex-
cess of their PIP coverage.46 An exception would exist when the
injury was caused by a tortfeasor's alcohol or drug abuse, in which
event no restriction on the right to sue in tort would apply. 47 As to
accidents between PIP insureds and those electing to stay under the
tort system, tort insureds would make a claim against their own in-
surer for both economic and non-economic loss-under coverage
termed "tort maintenance coverage"-just as they do today under
uninsured motorists' coverage. 48 Claims for economic loss in ex-
44. See O'Connell & Joost, supra note 41, at 70-72 (arguing that no-fault payments
subsidize liability claims by enabling the plaintiff to reject unsatisfactory settlement of-
fers, as well as by serving as a multiplier of pain and suffering claims). See also Jeffrey
O'Connell & Michael Horowitz, The Lawyer Will See You Now, WASH. PosT, June 13, 1993,
at C3.
45. Peter Passell, Bush's Bold Plan for Car Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1992, at 41.
See also O'Connell &Joost, supra note 41, at 63, 77-82 (proposing a new scheme allowing
motorists a choice between no-fault and traditional insurance). The Bush administra-
tion proposal was crafted at the urging, and with the participation, of Michael Horowitz
and Jeffrey O'Connell. See Passell, supra, at 41.
46. Passell, supra note 45, at 41. Just as one could opt to buy more liability insurance
than financial responsibility limits mandate, so too could one opt to buy more PIP cover-
age than financial responsibility limits mandate.
47. Id.
48. See infra note 55. The defendant in a tort maintenance claim would be the in-
sured's own insurer, not the tortfeasor. On the philosophical question of whether it is
necessary for tort payments to be made by, or even on behalf of, tortfeasors (by their
liability insurers, for example), see Symposium: Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care
One Gives One's Neighbors, 77 IOWA L. REV. 443-44, 445, 672-74, 677, 698-99, 703-04
(1992). See also JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS chs. 16, 18, 19 (1992). For an an-
swer to possible adverse selection under a choice plan, see O'Connell &Joost, supra note
41, at 88 n.4.
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COMPENSATION SYSTEMS SYMPOSIUM
cess of one's own tort maintenance coverage would be allowed
against PIP insureds. In accidents between two tort liability in-
sureds, the current common-law system would apply without
change.
Furthermore, PIP coverage would be in excess of all collateral
sources 49 and payable periodically. When claims for economic loss
in excess of either PIP or tort maintenance coverages are pursued, a
reasonable attorney's fee, in addition to economic loss, would be
recoverable.5" No change would be made in the law applicable to
property damage. 5'
III. ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF THE CHOICE PLAN
A. General Approach
The objective here is to estimate how the adoption of the choice
plan would affect the costs of auto insurance in states now having
the traditional tort system. The focus is on the effects of the choice
plan on the amount each insured motorist must be charged, on av-
erage, to defray the costs of compensating auto accident victims. As
used here, compensation costs include all the costs auto insurers
incur in compensating auto accident victims, including both the
compensation paid to accident victims from all forms of auto insur-
49. But see infra text accompanying note 64.
50. This is necessary because attorneys' fees today are normally paid out of damage
awards for pain and suffering; thus, a regime not paying for pain and suffering calls for
an alternate source for such payment.
51. The rationale for excluding property damage from no-fault coverage is ex-
plained in Robert E. Keeton & Jeffrey O'Connell, Basic Protection Automobile Insurance,
1967 U. ILL. L.F. 400, 411-12.
Appendix II sets forth the terms of some key provisions of a tentative draft bill
implementing the federal proposal-a bill worked out by Jeffrey O'Connell and Michael
Horowitz with lawyers at the Civil Division of the U.S. Department ofJustice, with addi-
tional input from the White House Domestic Policy Council, the Office of Management
and Budget, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Office of Legal Counsel in the
Department ofJustice. The bill was drafted in order to convey, in some detail, what the
principal provisions that would eventually emerge in a final draft would look like. Even
a final federal bill, however, would, in the interest of federalism, be less detailed than
earlier "choice" bills drafted by Professor O'Connell for state enactment. See O'Connell
& Joost, supra note 41, at 80-82 (describing more extensively the components of a stat-
ute creating a choice-based automobile insurance system);Jeffrey O'Connell, A Draft Bill
to Allow Choice Between No-Fault and Fault-Based Auto Insurance, 27 HARV. J. LEGIS. 144
(1990); Jeffrey O'Connell & Robert H. Joost, A Model Bill Allowing Choice Between Auto
Insurance Payable With and Without Regard to Fault, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 947 (1990). For a
provision in this model bill requiring insurers to make available "pain and suffering
coverage . . . with a [minimum] limit of $50,000, payable if the insured person sustains
... a [defined] serious injury," see id. at 965. Such a provision could be readily added to
the proposal made herein.
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ance and all transaction costs involved in making such payments.52
This, of course, neglects the many other factors, such as insurers'
overhead and profit margins and investment income, that also enter
into the determination of insurance premiums. Compensation
costs, however, are a major component of insurance premiums and,
in the long run, the effects of the choice plan on insurance premi-
ums should be broadly similar in direction and order of magnitude
to its effects on compensation costs. 5 3
In focusing on the effects of the choice plan on the costs of auto
insurance to insured motorists, we first estimated what auto insurers
would have to charge the average insured motorist to recover the
costs they incur in compensating accident victims under all cover-
ages under the traditional tort system. We then developed corre-
sponding estimates for motorists who elect to remain in the tort
system and for motorists who elect PIP coverage under the choice
plan. These estimates were then compared to determine how the
adoption of the choice plan would affect the costs of auto insurance
to motorists, depending on their insurance status under the choice
plan.
Specifically, under the traditional tort system, motorists may
purchase several different personal injury coverages-Bodily Injury
(BI),5 4 Uninsured Motorist (UM), Underinsured Motorist (UIM), 55
and Medical Payments (MedPay).56 Accordingly, under that system,
insured motorists must bear the sum of the compensation costs of
each of those coverages. The compensation cost of the traditional
tort system to the average insured motorist is estimated as the sum
of what insurers pay out and the associated transactions costs under
all the above coverages, divided by the total number of insured mo-
52. Tort claimants pay their legal fees and costs out of any compensation they
receive.
53. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
54. "Bodily Injury" refers to tort liability coverage for personal injury, thereby ex-
cluding property damage.
55. Uninsured coverage (UM) pays up to the limit specified in the policy when the
insured or others in the insured vehicle are injured by uninsured or hit-and-run drivers.
Thus the insured's own insurer pays what the insured person is eligible to recover in tort
from the other uninsured-at-fault driver. Underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) simi-
larly pays the injured and other occupants of the insured vehicle under UIM coverage
when the at-fault driver has liability coverage but with lower limits than those carried by
the insured.
56. Medical payments coverage is a supplemental coverage payable by one's own
insurance company for medical expenses without regard to fault, often at low limits, e.g.,
$500-$1000.
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torists. Motorists who are uninsured, of course, bear none of the
costs of auto insurance.
Under the choice plan, recall that motorists may remain in the
tort system, elect PIP coverage, or go uninsured (illegally). Those
who remain in the tort system will purchase tort maintenance cover-
age in addition to BI, and possibly UM and MedPay. We estimated
the average tort insured motorist's compensation costs under the
choice plan as the sum of what auto insurers pay injured people and
the associated transactions costs under all coverages on behalf of
tort insured motorists, divided by the total number of tort insured
motorists. Note that the average tort insured motorist's compensa-
tion costs include the costs insurers incur on her behalf in providing
compensation under tort liability-type coverages-BI, UM, and tort
maintenance-and any MedPay coverage.
Motorists who elect PIP coverage under the choice plan
purchase not only PIP but may also purchase BI to cover liability
claims brought against them by others for losses in excess of policy
limits. The average PIP insured's compensation costs are estimated
as the sum of the costs auto insurers incur on behalf of motorists
who elect PIP for both their PIP and their BI coverages, divided by
the number of PIP insureds. Note that this average equals the costs
insurers incur on behalf of PIP insureds in providing compensation
under both their PIP coverage and their BI coverage. As was the
case under the traditional tort system, people who go uninsured
under the choice plan bear none of the costs of compensating auto
accident victims.
B. The Results
The effects of the choice plan on premiums charged particular
drivers will vary with such factors as the coverages they buy, their
policy limits, the insurer they buy from, the type of car and mileage
driven, as well as the home state and their location within that state.
So our estimates are only meant to indicate the general nature of
cost effects averaged over all drivers, keeping such variables in
mind.
The following discussion involves both Figures 1 and 2 below.
Figure 1 combines the results for all states having the traditional
tort system but assumed to have adopted a choice system. By and
large the savings of thus adopting a choice plan are similar across all
states, although the savings are especially high in Louisiana. Indeed
the savings in Figure 2 for California are identical to the results
across all states, with two exceptions for those who choose to re-
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main insured under tort criteria appearing at the end of the discus-
sion of Figures 1 and 2. The savings for those who choose PIP turn
out to be very substantial-in the sixty to sixty-five percent range for
personal injury coverage. (This relatively small five percent differ-
ential turns on three variables discussed in the immediately follow-
ing paragraph.) The discussion of Figures 1 and 2 is followed by
individual results for some representative states, including Illinois
(Figure 3), Louisiana (Figure 4), North Carolina (Figure 5), and
Ohio (Figure 6).
The three variables shown in Figures 1-6 below are as follows:
(1) the uninsured motorist rate under the traditional tort system, (2)
the rate at which motorists insured under the traditional tort system
would opt for PIP coverage if given the choice, and (3) the rate at
which uninsureds under the traditional tort system would opt for
PIP coverage if given the choice.57 The results are presented first in
Figures 1 and 2.
The vertical axis is the percentage reduction in compensation
costs under the choice plan relative to compensation costs under the
traditional tort system. The horizontal axis is the proportion of mo-
torists who had been uninsured under the traditional tort system.
The solid line denoted "PIP insured under choice" plots the results
for motorists who had been insured under the traditional tort sys-
tem who then opted for PIP coverage under choice, correlated with
various uninsured motorist rates that had existed under the tradi-
tional tort system, assuming that fifty percent of motorists both in-
sured and uninsured under the traditional tort system opted for PIP
under choice. For example, this PIP line shows a relative savings of
about sixty-three percent when the uninsured motorist rate is
twenty percent. This means that if the choice plan were adopted in
a state in which the uninsured motorist rate had been twenty per-
cent, and if both insured and uninsured motorists in that state opted
for PIP coverage at a fifty percent rate, the average PIP insured who
had been insured under the traditional tort system would save sixty-
three percent on what he would have to pay to defray an insurer's
compensation costs for bodily injury compared to what he would
have to pay under the traditional tort system.
The vertical bars attached to the solid PIP line show how the
estimate would change if the rates at which motorists selected PIP
coverage were either higher or lower than fifty percent. The upward
57. See supra Section III.A. For more on the basis of our cost estimates, see infra
Appendix III.
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bars show the estimate if we assume that twenty percent of insured
and previously uninsured motorists opted for PIP coverage. The
downward bars show what would happen if eighty percent of in-
sured and uninsured motorists opted for PIP under choice.5" For
example, the upward vertical bar attached to the PIP line at a former
uninsured motorist rate of twenty percent has a value of about sixty-
four percent. If the choice plan were adopted in a state where the
uninsured motorist rate had been twenty percent and if both in-
sured and uninsured motorists in that state opted for PIP coverage
at a twenty percent rate, insurers would have to charge the average
PIP insured who had been insured under the traditional tort system
only about thirty-six percent (one hundred minus sixty-four) of what
they would have had to charge that motorist under the traditional
tort system. The downward bar attached to the PIP line at an unin-
sured motorist rate of twenty percent shows that if eighty percent of
insured and uninsured motorists under the traditional tort system
opted for PIP coverage under choice, those who had been insured
under the traditional tort system would realize savings of about
sixty-two percent.
Thus the estimated savings for motorists who had been insured
under the traditional tort system but opt for PIP coverage under a
choice plan do not much depend on the situation in a given state
regarding the uninsured motorist rate under the traditional tort sys-
tem nor on the rate at which motorists then opt for PIP coverage.
Because PIP insureds under choice are not liable for others' non-
economic losses, the compensation costs incurred on their behalf
are substantially lower compared to the traditional tort system, re-
gardless of such other conditions. This is confirmed by the fact that,
generally speaking, in Figures 1-6 the line labeled "PIP insured
under choice" is relatively flat. For all practical purposes, then,
costs for PIP insureds vary very little with the rate motorists had
58. Motorists who opt for PIP are exposed to claims for economic loss in excess of
the limits of a claimant's own PIP coverage or, in the case of a tort insured, a claimant's
own tort maintenance coverage. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49. If the tort
insurance limits that tort insureds purchase for their tort maintenance coverage approxi-
mate the relatively high limits they purchased for BI coverage under the traditional tort
system, see RAND, supra note 4, at 105 (indicating that nationwide, almost two-thirds of
motorists buy more than $25,000 of BI limits), then the likelihood that a PIP insured will
have to compensate a tort insured for economic loss will be small, and the larger the
proportion of people who remain in tort the smaller will be the expected cost of supple-
mental BI coverage for those who choose PIP. Hence the higher the limits purchased by
tort insureds, the larger the savings for PIP insureds. And vice versa. See also infra note
60 and accompanying text.
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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
been uninsured under the traditional tort system. 59 Furthermore,
because PIP insureds are insulated from damages for non-economic
losses suffered by other motorists, whether uninsured or otherwise,
the savings to a PIP insured are largely independent of whether or
how others insure under the choice system. These savings, as indi-
cated, will be between sixty and sixty-five percent in compensation
costs across all tort states adopting choice and for California in par-
ticular, presumably therefore translating into such savings on total
auto insurance premiums for bodily injury.
On the other hand, as shown on the line in Figures 1 and 2
labeled "Tort Insured under traditional tort system," costs for mo-
torists who elect to remain in tort under the choice plan will be only
slightly affected by the adoption of a choice plan.6 ° The solid line
denoted "Tort insured under choice" presents the corresponding
results for the motorists who were insured under the traditional tort
system and opted to remain in tort under the choice plan. Here,
too, the variables mentioned above do not change things very much.
For example, if the uninsured rate was low under the former tort
system-less than ten percent or so-the costs for tort insureds
under choice may indeed increase slightly-possibly as much as
three percent (one percent in California).6 If the uninsured motor-
ist rate had been larger, they will realize some savings, possibly as
much as two percent (six percent in California). These varying re-
sults reflect the effects of the choice plan on the costs of compensat-
ing uninsured motorists. In computing costs incurred on behalf of
insured motorists, the full common-law costs incurred by insurers of
tort insureds in compensating uninsured motorists are included in
59. What small variations there are reflect varying costs of supplemental BI coverage
under varying conditions. See supra note 57; see also infra notes 60-61 and accompanying
text concerning the variations in cost for those choosing tort under a choice system.
60. For tort insureds, the upper bar reflects an assumption under choice that 80% of
insured and previously uninsured motorists opted for PIP coverage, with the downward
bar showing what would happen if only 20% of insured and previously uninsured mo-
torists opted for PIP. This is just the opposite for the bars for PIP insureds. See supra
note 58 and accompanying text. Why the difference?
Tort insureds are at risk for full common-law tort damages-covering both non-
economic as well as economic losses--only to other tort insureds and uninsured motor-
ists. By way of contrast, they are exposed to PIP insureds only for excess economic loss.
Thus, as the percentage of motorists choosing PIP grows bigger, the exposure of tort
insureds grows smaller. Hence the larger the savings for tort insureds. And vice versa.
61. It will be noted that in Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, at a rate of 15% of uninsured
motorists under the traditional tort system, the line labeled "Tort insured under choice"
dips below "0," indicating an increase in cost, i.e., "negative savings." (In Figure 5, the
line is close to "0.") This results from two interrelating factors explained infra, text
accompanying and following note 62.
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the calculations-just as they are under the traditional tort system.
This reflects the fact that under the traditional tort system, unin-
sured motorists pay nothing into the insurance system-but even so
are eligible for full common-law damages from it.62 If, then, there
were few uninsured motorists in the first place, the costs of compen-
sating them would not be large under a choice of tort and the sav-
ings realized by inducing uninsured motorists into the insurance
system by a choice plan would be correspondingly small. On the
other hand, if there were many uninsured motorists under the tradi-
tional tort system and the choice plan succeeds in bringing even a
small fraction of them into insured status, the savings for those who
choose tort could be somewhat higher-but still much less than for
those who choose PIP.
As indicated above, there follow Figures 3-6 for some other
representative individual states. As also indicated above, the most
important thing to glean from Figures 2-6 is how the general pat-
tern of savings from Figure 1 applies to all states, despite relatively
marginal individual differences.
Savings in the sixty to sixty-five percent range for personal in-
jury are, of course, very high. Furthermore, such estimates are con-
servative. Based on the available data,63 estimates by RAND only
subtracted as collateral sources private health insurance benefits,
excluding any publicly mandated sources such as Medicare, Medi-
caid, and workers' compensation, and all private sick leave or disa-
bility coverages for wage loss.6" In addition, with no or at least
greatly lessened incentives to incur medical bills and wage loss as a
means of inflating claims for pain and suffering, 65 those who opt for
PIP should oftentimes be inclined to incur lower economic losses
and/or forego making claims at all compared to their inclinations
under the traditional tort system. But RAND's estimates, without
any means in its data of precisely weighing those likely reductions,
do not include them.66 One should also note that the savings mirror
62. Under the proposal as presented herein, tort insureds under the choice plan con-
tinue to be fully liable to uninsured motorists. See infra Appendix II. The choice plan
could, however, be drafted such as to allow uninsured motorists to collect only eco-
nomic losses against both tort and PIP insureds, resulting in slightly larger savings to
tort insureds.
63. See infra Appendix III.
64. See supra text accompanying note 49.
65. On the effects of such inflation see supra text accompanying notes 34-38; see also
supra note 44.
66. But see CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 224-3 1, where in an alternate hypothesis
RAND assumes that elimination of payment for pain and suffering will reduce both the
size and number of claims, leading to a further reduction in cost of about 4%, added to a
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progressive taxation in that they will be higher still for the less afflu-
ent. This results from freeing PIP insureds from any obligation to
buy supplementary BI liability insurance-a freedom that will be
embraced by those having few or no assets to protect, that is, the
poor. RAND's estimates are based on the premise that anyone
choosing PIP coverage would also buy supplementary BI coverage
at the same BI limits they had bought under the traditional tort sys-
tem. For former tort insureds who had bought liability coverage to
protect their assets, that assumption would be correct. But many
poorer motorists with few or no assets had previously bought BI
only to comply with state financial responsibility laws and would not
buy supplementary BI coverage under a choice system. With an
obligation under choice, then, to buy only PD liability plus PIP (ex-
cluding also collision and comprehensive coverage), savings of sixty
to sixty-five percent on the BI side would translate into savings, not
of about thirty to thirty-three percent in total premium but rather
about forty-five to fifty percent (assuming PD liability costs-as dis-
tinguished from collision coverage costs-are typically only about
one-third of total liability costs, including both BI and PD).68
IV. A FURTHER RESULT?
Another potential advantage might be mentioned under a first-
party system whereby both those who choose traditional tort cover-
age as well as those who choose PIP coverage are paid by their own
insurers. In their book, The Struggle for Auto Safety, authors Jerry
Mashaw, a Yale law professor, and David Harfst, a Washington,
D.C., lawyer, tell what they deem the sad but edifying tale of the
ineffectiveness of the command and control regime instituted by the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the
agency charged by Congress with regulating the safety of
automobiles.6 9 They contend that NHTSA has been increasingly
enmeshed in prolonged administrative proceedings, experiencing
massive reversals by the federal courts and a Congress that has ap-
finding of a 22% cost reduction for a system, set forth in the first column of Table I and
the third column of Table 2 supra, with a benefit level of $15,000 and a strong verbal
threshold.
67. See infra note 90. For a further source of possible savings, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 69-74.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 25, 43 & 53. See also INSURANCE INSTITUTE,
supra note 24, at 2.
69. JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 41-45
(1990). For a review of the book, see Michael J. Trebilcock, Requiem for Regulators: The
Passing of a Counter-Culture, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 497 (1991).
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parently abandoned its commitment to the initial ideals of the Act.7"
According to their exhaustively documented view, in the wake ofju-
dicial and legislative assaults on the agency's original statutory man-
date for air bags and other injury-preventing devices, NHTSA has
shifted its focus from regulation by rule-making, which is difficult to
justify before skeptical judges and legislators, to regulation by recall
of defective vehicles, which is relatively easy to get everyone to un-
derstand-a shift that continues to the present day, with highly dele-
terious results. Since the early 1970s, Mashaw and Harfst argue,
NHTSA has adopted few if any new safety standards, while the
number of mandatory recalls of cars with unsafe features has esca-
lated dramatically. 71 But despite the number of recalls, they cite
empirical evidence that indicates that the effect of recalls on en-
hanced safety is trivial, perhaps on the order of less than 1.5 percent
in reduction of deaths and injuries.72
While not ignoring the difficulties involved, Mashaw and Harfst
in their final chapter suggest that a better prospect for achieving
vehicle safety may lie in a movement towards first-party insurance of
the type suggested herein. 73 Such a movement could provide an
effective extra incentive-reduced auto insurance rates-for motor-
ists to purchase cars that reduce their own accident costs. The pros-
pect for such an incentive is clearly attenuated under traditional tort
third-party liability insurance, in which the lessening of insurance
payouts from the greater auto safety accrues not to an insurer's own
insureds but to negligent third parties whose liabilities are corre-
spondingly reduced when colliding with an insurer's own insureds.
Because the benefits of increased safety do not accrue to them, there
is no way for insurers to reward their own insureds for installing
injury-reducing devices. With first-party insurance, however,
whether PIP or tort maintenance coverage, the situation changes
dramatically. Under such a system, an insurer can reduce premiums
for safer cars, secure in the knowledge that the savings from injury-
reducing devices will accrue to its own insureds and not to third-
parties unknowable in advance. 4
70. MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 69, at 13.
71. Id. at 11-12.
72. Id. at 168.
73. Id. at 242.
74. Id. at 501. But see Warren Brown, Air Bag Aftermath: The Device Saves Lives, But
Socks Insurance Firms as Medical Costs Rise, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1993, at HI (indicating
that while air bags save lives, they may end up causing insurers higher costs in payments
for surviving victims' medical and rehabilitation expenses that can be far larger than
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V. CONCLUSION
With the defeat of President Bush in the 1992 election, pros-
pects for a federal bill incorporating choice of coverage and waiver
of recovery for pain and suffering may well be greatly diminished.75
But even so, the issue of high-and rising-auto insurance costs as-
sures that interest in "choice" auto insurance can be expected, at
least at the state level. This is so, argue proponents of change, be-
cause such proposals could radically drive down the high cost of in-
surance while also having the political virtue of arguably freeing the
debate from the claims that reform involves involuntary surrender
of rights by consumers. In this connection, can consumers be
trusted to have additional rights and understand complex auto in-
surance liability options? Proponents of choice answer that con-
sumers must exercise many options in buying life, health, disability,
or homeowners' insurance, and even in buying first-party auto in-
surance under uninsured motorist coverage and collision and com-
prehensive coverages applicable to damage to their cars as well as in
selecting appropriate limits under tort liability coverage.
Further, proponents of choice argue that the political equation
may now be altered in that important segments of the consumer
movement have recently broken with Ralph Nader and the trial bar
in calling for drastic systemic reform of the auto tort system.76 Even
more to the point, argue proponents of choice, this new critique,
along with recommending first-party no-fault coverage, is signifi-
cantly based on the proposition that the pain-and-suffering compo-
nent of auto tort law is an important aspect of what they contend is
tort law's anti-consumer character. Proponents point to a recent re-
port by the National Insurance Consumer Organization, an organi-
zation closely associated with Ralph Nader, that generally defends
the tort system but breaks with Nader in describing the pain-and-
would have been payable in death benefits). Note that higher costs per case would not
explain higher claim frequency. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
75. It might be noted, though, that a version of the Bush administration bill in Ap-
pendix II has been introduced as H.R. -, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) by Congressman
Christopher Cox (R. Cal.).
76. Andrew Tobias, . . Fairness and Efficiency Are Vital, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1993,
§ 3, at 11 (viewpoint) (promoting a private, no-fault auto-insurance reform that elimi-
nates pain and suffering claims and is funded at the pump by a gasoline surcharge);
Michael Horowitz, Let Drivers Tailor Auto Insurance .. , N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1993, § 3, at
II (viewpoint) (promoting the consumer-choice plan over Tobias's "pay-at-the-pump"
plan, criticizing Tobias's as too politicized and bureaucratized); Peter Passell, The Nation,
This California Dream is All About Auto Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1993, at E4 (describ-
ing the "pay-at-the-pump" proposal for auto insurance reform and noting the criticism
and obstacles the proposal faces).
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suffering component of automobile tort law as a "dream for huge
rewards ... [that] is, for almost all, only a dream. And whatever
large sums are awarded are heavily taxed by the lawyers .... On
economic grounds it's a bad buy. ...""
In short, regardless of one's views of the merits of all this, the
issue of auto insurance reform will remain, whether at the federal
or, more likely, state level. And the merits of allowing motorists to
opt out of payment for pain and suffering and other non-economic
loss, while receiving automatic payment for economic loss,7 8 will re-
main a part-and perhaps even at the heart-of the debate.
77. Pay-At-The Pump: Private No-Fault Auto Insurance-A Proposal by the Na-
tional Insurance Consumer Organization ii (Nat'l Ins. Consumer Org., Alexandria, Va.,
undated); see also ANDREW TOBIAS, AUTO INSURANCE ALERT! 57-58 (1993).
78. For a study echoing points made herein and emphasizing the necessity of PIP
payments while concomitantly eliminating claims for pain and suffering as a means of
controlling auto insurance costs, see J. David Cummins and Sharon Tennyson, Control-
ling Automobile Insurance Costs, 6J. ECON. PERSP. 95 (1992).
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APPENDIX II
[SOME DRAFT PROVISIONS OF A BILL]
To provide a means for motor vehicle insurance customers and
motor vehicle insurance providers to agree upon optional insurance
provisions to reduce liability costs, expedite resolution of claims,
ensure fair and prompt payment of claims, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SHORT TITLE
This act may be cited as the "Motor Vehicle Personal Protection
Insurance Act of 1992."
TITLE I. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
SECTION 101. Findings.
The Congress finds that:
(a) Motor vehicle insurance costs are excessive due to the costs
of litigation and payment of claims and administrative costs
due to the necessity to determine liability;
(b) Consumer choice in selection of motor vehicle insurance
would be greatly enhanced if each consumer could decide
upon the form of insurance that best suits the individual
needs of the consumer;
(c) Insurance to indemnify individuals for personal injury aris-
ing from motor vehicle collisions is frequently unavailable
at reasonable cost because of the potential for third-party
claims; and
(d) A system enabling individuals to select the form of motor
vehicle insurance coverage that best suits individual needs
would enhance individual freedom and reduce the costs of
the motor vehicle insurance provided through our free en-
terprise system due to market-based competition.
SECTION 102. Purpose
It is the purpose of this Act to authorize consumers of motor
vehicle insurance to choose between their present tort remedies
under State law and a system which combines first-party insurance
and the right to sue negligent drivers for all further uncompensated
economic losses.
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TITLE II. MOTOR VEHICLE PERSONAL PROTECTION
CONTRACTS
SECTION 201. Motor Vehicle Personal Protection Insurance Act.
Title - of the United States Code is hereby amended by ad-
ding a new section, as follows:
SECTION _. Motor Vehicle Personal Protection Act.
(a) Insurance Policy Provisions.
(1) In General. An insurance policy that includes provisions
that entitle the insured to receive, without regard to
fault or lack of fault, the insured's net economic losses
caused by an injury along with an express, specific
waiver of tort rights as provided in the insurance policy
shall be valid notwithstanding any contrary provisions
of State law.
(2) State Law. In order for a personal protection insurance
policy to be covered by this Act, a motor vehicle insur-
ance policy issued by an insurer shall, at a minimum,
provide personal protection coverage; (i) up to the
minimum limits of liability insurance for personal in-
jury under the State's financial responsibility law; or,
(ii) in a State already covered by a no-fault motor vehi-
cle insurance law, up to the minimum level of insur-
ance required for no-fault benefits or liability insurance
for personal injury, whichever is greater, and shall con-
tain provisions under the State's financial responsibility
law, including those related to liability for property
damage, except to the extent State law would bar con-
tractual provisions giving effect to personal protection
authorizations set forth in this Act, or to the extent that
State law would be contrary to other provisions of this
Act.
(3) Periodic Payment and Penalty Upon Insurers. A personal
protection insurer is authorized to contract to pay per-
sonal protection benefits periodically as losses accrue.
Unless the treatment or expenses related thereto are in
reasonable dispute, an insurer who does not pay a
claim for net economic loss covered by a personal pro-
tection insurance under this Act within thirty days after
payment is due, shall pay the loss compounded at a
rate of 50% per annum, as liquidated damages and in
lieu of any penalty or exemplary damages.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of this Act, the term:
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(1) "accident" means unforeseen or unplanned event
causing loss or injury;
(2) "economic loss" means reasonable amounts incurred
for necessary health care treatment and medical ex-
penses, lost wages, burial expenses, replacement ser-
vice losses, and other pecuniary expenditures due to
personal injuries suffered by an individual as a result
of a motor vehicle accident, and for personal protec-
tion a death benefit equal to the amount of the mini-
mum level of liability insurance required pursuant to
State law for personal injury resulting from motor ve-
hicle accidents; subject to a deduction for amounts
payable for lost wages or replacement services losses;
(3) "financial responsibility law" means a statute (includ-
ing, but not limited to, one requiring compulsory cov-
erage) penalizing motorists for failing to carry defined
limits of tort liability insurance covering motor vehicle
accidents;
(4) "insurer" includes a person who is self-insured within
the meaning of applicable State law;
(5) "intentional misconduct" means conduct whereby
harm is intentionally caused or attempted to be
caused by one who acts or fails to act for the purpose
of causing harm or with knowledge that harm is sub-
stantially certain to follow when such conduct caused
or substantially contributed to the harm claimed for.
A person does not intentionally cause or attempt to
cause harm; (i) merely because his or her act or failure
to act is intentional or done with the realization that it
creates a grave risk of causing harm; or (ii) if the act or
omission causing bodily harm is for the purpose of
averting bodily harm to oneself or another person;
(6) "motor vehicle" means a vehicle of any kind required
to be registered under the provisions of the applicable
State law relating to motor vehicles;
(7) "net economic loss" means economic loss, including
when payable based on fault, a reasonable attorney's
fee calculated on the basis of the value of the attor-
ney's efforts as reflected in payment to the attorney's
client. The term excludes amounts paid or payable
under:
(i) Federal, State, or private disability or sickness
programs;
10471993]
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(ii) Federal, State, or private health insurance
programs;
(iii) employer wage continuation programs;
(iv) workers' compensation or similar occupational
compensation acts; and
(v) any other source of payment intended to compen-
sate such individual for injuries resulting from a
motor vehicle accident;
(8) "no-fault motor vehicle law" means a statute under
which those injured in motor vehicle accidents are
paid without regard to fault for their pecuniary losses
as a result of personal injury, in return for which
claims based on fault including for nonpecuniary
losses, are to a defined extent limited;
(9) "non-economic loss" means physical and emotional
pain, suffering, physical impairment, emotional dis-
tress, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoy-
ment, and loss of companionship, services,
consortium and other nonpecuniary losses incurred
by an individual as a result of a motor vehicle
accident;
(10) "person" means any individual, corporation, com-
pany, association, firm, partnership, society, joint
stock company, or any other entity (including any
governmental entity);
(11) "personal protection" means an insurance contract
payable without regard to fault for net economic loss
due to personal injury resulting from a motor vehicle
accident, along with waiver of tort claims pursuant to
the Act;
(12) "replacement service loss" means expenses reason-
ably incurred in obtaining ordinary and necessary
services from others, not members of the injured per-
son's household, in lieu of the services the injured
person would have performed for the benefit of the
household;
(13) "resident relative or dependent" means a person re-
lated to the owner of a motor vehicle by blood, mar-
riage, adoption, or otherwise (including a dependent
receiving financial services or support from such
owner), and residing in the same household at the
time of accidental personal injury. A person resides
in the same household if he or she usually makes his
1048 [VOL. 52:1016
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or her home in the same family unit, even though
temporarily living elsewhere;
(14) "State" means any State of the United States, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, the
Northern Mariana Islands, the Trust Territories of the
Pacific Islands, and any other territory or possession
of the United States;
(15) "tort liability" means the legal obligation for payment
of damages caused by one adjudged to have commit-
ted a tort;
(16) "tort liability insurance" means insurance by the
terms of which an insurer agrees to pay, on behalf of
an insured, damages the latter is obligated to pay a
third person because of his or her liability to that
third person;
(17) "tort maintenance coverage" means coverage under
which a tort liability insured, when involved in an acci-
dent with a personal protection insured, retains his or
her right to claim for personal injury under state law
without modification by any provision of this Act ex-
cept that responsibility for payment for any such claim
is assumed by his or her own insurer to the extent of
such coverage under subsection (c)(1);
(18) "uninsured motorist" means the owner of a motor ve-
hicle, including his or her resident relatives, unin-
sured for either personal protection or tort liability
insurance at the limits prescribed by the applicable
state's financial responsibility law or higher under
subsection (2)(ii) of this section.
(c) Operation of the Right to Choose. Under this Act, in lieu of buy-
ing traditional tort liability insurance for personal injury to
protect third parties, motorists have the right to choose per-
sonal protection which will be available to themselves and
their family members in the event of a motor vehicle acci-
dent, including the amount of financial protection they
deem appropriate and affordable for themselves and such
others. As an alternative, motorists have the right to elect
traditional tort liability coverage for personal injury at the
minimum limits (or higher) under the State's financial re-
sponsibility law.
(1) A motorist who chooses traditional tort liability has au-
tomatically included in such coverage tort maintenance
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coverage at least at the equivalent of the minimum
levels of insurance under (i) the State's financial re-
sponsibility law for personal injury or (ii) the State's
no-fault motor vehicle law (if it has one), whichever is
higher. Such a motorist who is involved in an accident
with another motorist remains subject to tort law for
personal injury except that, based on fault, (a) he or
she can be claimed against by those covered by per-
sonal protection policies only for net economic loss in
excess of the limits of the claimant's own personal pro-
tection policy, and (b) he or she cannot claim against
those covered by personal protection insurance except
for net economic loss. As to the latter claim, a deduc-
tion is made against the recovery equal to the limits of
tort maintenance coverage applicable to the claimant.
(2) A motorist who chooses personal protection coverage
and who is involved in an accident with another such
motorist is compensated under his or her own policy
for net economic loss only without regard to fault. But
if he or she sustains net economic loss in excess of his
or her policy's benefit levels, that person retains the
right to claim and sue for net economic loss based on
fault.
(3) If a motorist who has chosen personal protection cov-
erage is involved in an accident with an uninsured mo-
torist, the personal protection insured is compensated
for net economic loss without regard to fault according
to the terms of his or her personal protection policy,
and has the right to claim against the uninsured motor-
ist for net economic loss based on fault. The unin-
sured motorist forfeits the right to claim for non-
economic loss against the motorist who has chosen the
personal protection policy.
(4) A motorist who chooses either personal protection in-
surance or tort liability insurance also thereby binds by
such choice his or her resident relatives, provided that:
(i) an adult resident relative shall not be bound with-
out his or her consent, which, in the absence of ex-
press consent, shall be implied when the relative is
present in a motor vehicle operated by the motor-
ist; and
(ii) insurers are authorized to specify reasonable terms
and conditions governing the commencement, du-
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ration, and application of the chosen coverage de-
pending on the number of motor vehicles and
owners thereof in a household.
In order to minimize conflict between the two options,
insurers are authorized to maintain underwriting rules
that encourage uniformity within a household.
(5) A personal protection insured retains the right to
claim, and remains subject to a claim, for driving under
the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs, both as de-
fined by State law, or for intentional misconduct.
(6) A personal protection insured claims personal protec-
tion benefits, up to the limits of the coverage chosen by
or for him or her, in the following priority:
(a) the personal protection covering a motor vehicle
involved in the accident, if the person injured was
an occupant or was struck by such motor vehicle at
the time of the accident; followed by
(b) the personal protection under which the injured
person is or was an insured.
(7) A personal protection insurer is authorized to write
personal protection coverage (i) without any deducti-
ble or subject to a reasonable deductible not to exceed
$1,000 and (ii) with an exclusion of coverage for per-
sons driving under the influence of alcohol or illegal
drugs.
(8) A personal protection insurer is subrogated, to the ex-
tent of its obligations, to all of the rights of its personal
protection insured with respect to an accident caused
in whole or in part, as determined by applicable State
law, by the negligence of an uninsured motorist or
driving under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs,
or caused in whole or in part by intentional misconduct
or any person who is not affected by the limitations on
tort rights and liabilities under this Act.
(9) Any person lawfully uninsured under the terms of State
law for either personal protection or tort liability insur-
ance retains his or her tort rights in a form unaffected
by this Act.
(d) Renewal or Cancellation.
An insurer shall not cancel, fail to renew, or increase the
premium of its insured solely on account of the insured or
any other injured person making a claim for personal pro-
tection benefits or, where there is no basis for ascribing
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fault to the insured or one for whom the insured is vicari-
ously liable, for tort maintenance coverage.
(e) Immunity.
No insurer or any agent or employee of such insurer, no
insurance producer representing a motor vehicle insurer or
any automobile residual market plan, and no attorney li-
censed to practice law within this State shall be liable in an
action for damages on account of an election of the tort
liability option, an election of the personal protection op-
tion, or a failure to make a required election, unless such
person has willfully misrepresented the available choices or
has fraudulently induced the election of one system over
the other.
(f) In General.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed-
(1) to waive or affect any defense of sovereign immunity
asserted by any State under any law or by the United
States;
(2) to preempt State choice-of-law rules with respect to
claims brought by a foreign nation or a citizen of a for-
eign nation;
(3) to affect the right of any court to transfer venue, to ap-
ply the law of a foreign nation, or to dismiss a claim of
a foreign nation or of a citizen of a foreign nation on
the ground of inconvenient forum;
(4) subject to subsection (1) of this Section, to create or
vest jurisdiction in the district courts of the United
States over any motor vehicle accident liability and/or
damages action subject to this Act which is not other-
wise properly in the United States District Court;
(5) to prevent insurers and insureds from contracting to
limit recovery for lost wages and income under per-
sonal protection coverage such that only 60% or more
of lost wages or income is covered, or to offset death
benefits under personal protection coverage by
amounts paid for lost wages and replacement service
losses;
(6) to prevent an insurer from contracting with personal
protection insureds, as permitted by State law, to have
submitted to arbitration any dispute with respect to
payment of personal protection benefits;
(7) to relieve a motorist of the obligations imposed by
State law to purchase tort liability insurance for per-
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sonal injury to protect third parties who are not af-
fected by the immunities of Section (c).
(g) Jurisdiction. The United States District Courts shall have
original jurisdiction over any civil action to enforce any pro-
visions of this Act except for any civil action or claim for
monetary damages not otherwise within the jurisdiction of
the District Courts.
SECTION 202. Effective Date.
This Act shall become effective on its date of enactment.
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APPENDIX III
Factors that strongly influence the effects on costs of both the
tort system and a choice plan vary from one state to another. The
proportion of drivers who are uninsured under the traditional tort
system varies from state to state. Further, the available data on the
fraction of drivers who are uninsured are notoriously unreliable.
Similarly, the rates at which either uninsured drivers or insured
drivers under the traditional tort system would opt for PIP coverage
if it were available would likely vary among states and are, in any
event, unknown.79
We adopted the following approach in our analysis. We as-
sumed values for the proportion of drivers who are uninsured under
the traditional tort system and for the rates at which insured and
uninsured motorists, respectively, would opt for the PIP coverage if
it were made available to them. Given these assumptions, we esti-
mated the effects of the choice plan on people who were insured
under the traditional tort system and opt to remain in tort under the
choice plan and on people who were insured under the traditional
tort system and opt for the PIP coverage under the choice plan.80
We then varied one or another of the assumptions and repeated the
entire analysis. We repeated the process until we had systematically
considered all reasonable combinations of assumed values for these
key factors.
The results mapped out the effects of adopting the choice plan
for all possible combinations of values for these key factors. Ac-
cordingly, policymakers interested in the results for a specific state
can focus on that portion of the map that reflects what the values for
these factors are in that state. And, because the mapping shows how
the results vary as each of the factors varies, it indicates the sensitiv-
ity of the results to the values of the underlying factors.
A. Data
The study was based primarily on data from two sources:
79. Kentucky has long had, and New Jersey and Pennsylvania have recently adopted,
variations on a choice plan. All three preserve tort claims above a threshold. For Ken-
tucky's modest choice law, see Appendix I, 1. 9. For a critique of the New Jersey and
Pennsylvania laws, see O'Connell &Joost, supra note 51, at 949-51 & nn. 8-10. The
effects of a choice plan, like those of any legal standard, are likely to evolve over time as
the courts interpret and reinterpret the meaning of key words and phrases in the law and
participants in the system-claims' managers and plaintiffs' and defense attorneys-
learn how to use various aspects of the system to their advantage.
80. Note that people who are uninsured in either the traditional tort system or under
the choice plan pay nothing either before or after the choice plan is adopted.
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closed claim surveys 8' and a household survey,82 both conducted by
the Insurance Research Council (IRC), formerly named the All In-
dustry Research Advisory Council (AIRAC). AIRAC obtained de-
tailed information on a national sample of auto-accident injury
claims closed during 1987 under the principal auto-injury cover-
ages-BI, MedPay, UM, UIM, and PIP. The data were collected by
thirty-four insurance companies that together accounted for about
sixty percent of private-passenger automobile insurance by pre-
mium volume at the time the data were collected. Claims closed
without payment were not included.
We weighted the observations in each closed-claim file by the
inverse of the participating insurers' share of the private-passenger
auto insurance market state by state. Assuming that the distribution
of claims is proportional to the distribution of policies written and
that the participating insurers are representative of auto insurers
generally, the weighted sample for each state is representative of the
aggregate distribution of paid auto-insurance claims in that state.
We then merged the closed-claim files, adjusting for the probability
that a claimant who received compensation under one auto insur-
ance policy would have also received compensation from a collateral
claim for the same injuries or losses against another auto insurance
policy. 83
We used the IRC consumer-panel data to extend the database
to accident victims who received no auto-insurance compensation.
AIRAC provided data on the experiences of households in which
someone had suffered an injury in an auto accident between Octo-
ber 1982 and March 1986.84 We weighted the IRC consumer-panel
observations according to their stratified sample design and the re-
sponse rate within each stratum. We then extracted the observa-
tions for accident victims who received no compensation from any
form of auto insurance and merged them with the closed-claim data.
In merging the data, we adjusted the weights for the observations
81. For a description of the surveys, see COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE INJURIES IN
THE UNITED STATES (All-Industry Research Advisory Council, Schamburg, Ill., 1989).
82. For a description of the survey, see ATTORNEY INVOLVEMENT (All-Industry Re-
search Advisory Council, Dec. 1988).
83. For example, someone compensated under another driver's BI coverage might
also be compensated under his or her own MedPay coverage. The models used to esti-
mate these probabilities are presented in CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, App. C.
84. National Family Opinion, Inc. screened 200,000 households in a national panel
to identify those in which a member had suffered an injury in an auto accident within the
previous three years. A follow-up survey of households identified as having been in-
volved in an injury-producing accident obtained detailed information on the accident
and the amounts and sources of any resulting compensation.
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drawn from the consumer-panel survey so that the final weighted
database in the proportion of accident victims who received no com-
pensation is the same as it was in the consumer panel survey.
The database encapsulates the accidents and resulting injuries
and losses of a representative sample of people injured in auto acci-
dents in states with the traditional tort system. It also encapsulates
the compensation each person obtained from auto insurance, by
coverage.
We combined data from several sources to estimate insurers'
transaction costs. A. M. Best, Inc.,85 provides nationwide ratios of
total insurers' transaction costs to compensation (including both al-
located and unallocated claim CoStS8 6 ) for all lines of private-passen-
ger auto liability insurance combined. The Insurance Services
Office (ISO)87 provided us with estimates of ratios of transaction
costs to compensation, disaggregated by property damage versus
personal injury coverages and by allocated versus unallocated trans-
action claim expenses. The ISO also provided us with data on aver-
age insurers' transaction costs and compensation paid on a very
large national sample of claims, by line, for personal-injury auto-
insurance coverages.
We adjusted the ISO ratios to match the A. M. Best national
average data to estimate nationwide allocated-cost-to-compensation
ratios and nationwide unallocated-cost-to-compensation ratios for
auto personal-injury auto-insurance coverages, by line of insurance.
B. Compensation Costs Under the Tort System
We began by estimating the costs insurers incurred in compen-
sating each person in the sample under the traditional tort system.
We used actual compensation outcomes for reported claims. We
developed a series of models to estimate the outcomes of claims for
which actual compensation was not reported.88 We applied the ad-
justed ratios of transactions costs to compensation, by coverage, to
each person in the sample. The result was an estimate of the costs
85. BEST'S AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES: PROPERTY-CASUALTY (A.M. Best Co., 1989).
86. Allocated claim expense is defined as claim expense specifically allocated to an
individual claim such as the expense and time of adjusters and lawyers to work on a
given case. It is distinguished from unallocated claim expense which includes general
overhead costs for such things as maintenance of the claims department, claim files, etc.
Both are exclusive of other costs such as production expenses (sales commissions or
other acquisition costs), taxes or expenses for policy writing, recordkeeping, etc.
87. Insurance Services Office, Industry-Wide Expense Experience Released-Per-
sonal Auto, Exh. 6, at 3 (Jan. 31, 1990) (circular).
88. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, App. D, for details.
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insurers incurred in compensating a representative sample of peo-
ple injured in auto accidents under the traditional tort system. We
aggregated these costs over all persons in the sample to estimate the
total costs of compensation for the people included in the sample.
We assumed an insured motorist rate (a fraction composed of
one minus the uninsured motorist rate) and divided the assumed
rate into the estimate of total compensation costs. The result, if
multiplied by the ratio of auto accident victims to drivers, was the
amount insured drivers would have to be charged, on average, to
recover the costs of compensating all accident victims eligible for
payment under the traditional tort system and supplementary cover-
ages thereunder.
C. Compensation Costs Under the Choice Plan
The next step was to estimate the compensation costs that
would be incurred on behalf of drivers who opted for tort or for PIP
under the choice plan. We assumed that the election of insurance
status under the choice plan is independent of driver behavior-that
is, there is no adverse selection in drivers' insurance choices and the
election of an option does not affect the probabilities that a driver
will be involved in an accident and incur or cause the resulting inju-
ries and losses.89 Accordingly, the accidents and resulting injuries
and losses observed under the choice plan would be the same as
those observed under the tort system. Our database thus repre-
sented what would be the distributions of accidents, injuries, and
losses under the choice plan. We could estimate compensation
costs under the choice plan by estimating the compensation that
would have been provided each person in the sample had the choice
plan been in effect when they were injured.
The amount and source of compensation provided someone in-
jured in an auto accident under the choice plan depends on the in-
surance choices they, and each other person involved in the
accident, made (or had made on her behalf). Accordingly, we esti-
mated the compensation costs that would be borne by insurers on
behalf of tort and PIP insureds, respectively, in four steps.
First, we computed the amount and "source" of compensation
that would be provided each victim under each possible combina-
89. On the pros and cons of whether there will be adverse selection under a choice
plan, see O'Connell & Joost, supra note 41, at 88 n.74; Jack L. Carr, Giving .Mlotorists 4
Choice Between Fault and No-Fault Insurance: An Economic Critique, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1087, 1091-93 (1989).
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tion of insurance choices. In this context, the term "source" refers
to whether the purchaser of the policy under which the compensa-
tion is provided has elected tort or PIP coverage.
Second, we assumed rates at which persons who were either in-
sured or uninsured, respectively, under the traditional tort system
would shift to PIP coverage when that option was available to
them.9 0 Given those assumed rates, we estimated the probability
that each possible combination of insurance choices would obtain.
Third, we computed expected compensation costs, by source,
for the sample. We multiplied the compensation costs, by source,
associated with each combination of choices multiplied by the
probability of that combination. We then added up all possible
combinations of choices and all victims in the sample. The results
of this step were the total expected compensation costs incurred by
insurers on behalf of tort insureds and total expected compensation
costs incurred by insurers on behalf of PIP insureds.
Fourth, we divided the total expected compensation costs in-
curred on behalf of tort insureds by the assumed number of drivers
who opted for tort coverage under the choice plan. (The number of
tort insureds under the choice plan was obtained as the product of
two assumed numbers: the number of insured drivers under the
traditional tort system-that is, before adoption of the choice plan-
and the rate at which tort insureds shift to PIP coverage under the
choice plan.) The result, if multiplied by the ratio of auto accident
victims to drivers, was the amount drivers who opted to remain in
the tort system under the choice plan would have to be charged, on
average, to recover the compensation costs insurers incurred in
compensating accident victims on their behalf.
Fifth, we computed the relative savings in compensation costs
per driver, on average, for drivers who remained in the tort system
under choice. That is, we computed the percent changes in com-
pensation costs per driver, on average, for the drivers who opted to
remain under tort in the choice plan compared to average compen-
sation costs per driver for the same drivers under the tort system.
90. Persons who purchased BI insurance under the traditional tort system clearly
prefer third-party coverage to being uninsured. There is no reason to believe that the
availability of PIP coverage would reverse that preference. Hence, we could assume that
persons insured under the traditional tort system would either opt to remain under tort
or elect PIP coverage under the choice plan. Similarly, people uninsured under the
traditional tort system have demonstrated a preference for being uninsured rather than
purchasing third-party tort liability coverage. Hence, we could assume that motorists
uninsured under the traditional tort system would either continue to be uninsured or
elect PIP under the choice plan. But see supra text following note 67.
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The result was the percentage changes in what insurers would have
to charge the average driver who elects to remain in tort under the
choice plan to recover their compensation costs relative to what they
would have had to charge her under the tort system. If insurance
premiums are correlated with insurers' compensation costs,9 ' this
ratio shows whatever savings the average driver who elects tort
under the choice plan would realize relative to what that same driver
had to pay under the traditional tort system.
Sixth, we repeated steps four and five for PIP insureds under
the choice plan. That is, we divided the total expected compensa-
tion costs incurred on behalf of PIP insureds by the assumed
number of drivers who opted for PIP coverage under the choice
plan to estimate the amount insurers would have to charge drivers
who opted for PIP coverage under the choice plan, on average, to
recover the compensation costs incurred in compensating accident
victims on their behalf. We compared these estimates to what insur-
ers would have had to charge the same drivers to recover compensa-
tion costs incurred on their behalf under the traditional tort system.
The result was the relative savings on compensation costs incurred
on behalf of the average driver who elected PIP coverage under the
choice plan. If insurance premiums are correlated with insurers'
compensation costs, this ratio shows the costs of the choice plan to
the average driver who elects PIP relative to what that same driver
had to pay under the traditional tort system.
SURREBUTrAL
JEFFREY O'CONNELL & MICHAEL HOROWITZ9 2
There is neither time nor space to reply extensively to Professor
Arlen's ambitious condemnation of our proposal to substitute a sys-
tem whereby motorists can opt out of tort law for auto accidents,
with its fault-finding and payment for non-economic loss, in return
for automatic payment for economic loss alone. But let us make a
few points.
Professor Arlen backs herself into the rather curious position-
especially for an economist-of opposing changes in automobile in-
surance that will reduce costs. She does so on the ground that even
91. See supra text accompanying note 53.
92. We undertake this reply alone, relieving our co-authors from RAND of any obli-
gation to defend a proposal they explicitly neither endorse nor oppose.
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the present system-for all its legendary expense-does not suffi-
ciently internalize auto accident costs.
. . . [R]eplacing negligence liability with .. .no-fault liabil-
ity would lead to greater activity levels because it would
lower insurance premiums: both the number of motorists
and the frequency each motorist drives could be expected
to increase. Given that under negligence liability activity
levels are [already] too high, the increase in activity levels
brought about by replacing negligence liability with [the
proposed new] .. .system would clearly be undesirable.9"
But in fact the high costs of auto insurance that Professor Arlen
extols as promoting internalization (though still not high enough by
her reckoning) also promote gross, unfair (and deeply resented) ex-
ternalities. Tort liability costs today are so great that millions of
poor and relatively impecunious motorists cannot afford any auto-
mobile insurance.94 In addition, with few or no assets to protect,
their decision to go uninsured under tort liability makes eminently
good economic sense. Facing large unmet needs for essentials for
themselves and their families, why should they annually spend hun-
dreds of dollars-indeed often in the range of $1000 or more in
urban areas-to buy an arcane piece of paper providing highly con-
tingent payment to strangers far in the future? Admittedly, unin-
sured motorists violate state laws requiring liability insurance, so
one might urge that a solution here is better law enforcement to
"get the uninsureds off the road." Professor Arlen has herself effec-
tively provided the rebuttal to that solution: criminal laws regulat-
ing the conduct of motorists, she assures us, are not-and cannot
be 95-adequately enforced. "[D]espite stringent drunk driving
laws," she tells us, "Georgia has tens of thousands of repeat offend-
ers, and .. .judges do not take away drivers' licenses even when a
driver has 15 drunk-driving convictions. '"96 If those charged with
law enforcement ignore egregious conduct such as chronic drunk
driving, they certainly won't-and don't-punish the relatively in-
93. Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1093
(1993).
94. The percentage of uninsured motorists vastly exceeds 50% in the inner cities of
many major metropolitan areas. S.F. CHRON., Oct. 4, 1989, at A9; L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23,
1986, at 1. Professor Arlen acknowledges the problem, see Arlen, supra note 93, at 71,
but offers no solution.
95. See generally, Arlen, supra note 93.
96. Id. at 79.
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nocuous offense of driving without insurance.97 But that brings us
back to the externality of the present system, which has millions in
ever-increasing numbers paying nothing into the insurance pool,
while retaining their rights to claim from it. Professor Arlen com-
plains that our proposal will allow motorists to escape from internal-
izing non-economic losses, while herself failing to deal with the
huge numbers of people who, given the costs and structure of the
present system that she defends, pay for neither economic nor non-
economic losses.
At least under the choice system, those who opt out of the tort
system lose their right to be paid for non-economic damages, which
ought to internalize more of their losses and thus, under an econo-
mist's view, have a deterrent effect. Similarly, those who are unin-
sured will internalize more costs in that they are precluded from
collecting for non-economic losses in their tort claims against PIP
insureds. A deeply disturbing system, based on Professor Arlen's
own criteria, would seem to be the one she defends-one which, by
its very high costs and third-party structure, induces more and more
motorists to escape any contribution to accident compensation while
nonetheless making claims therefor.
On a broader scale, a basic difficulty with Professor Arlen's
piece-a difficulty plaguing much economics-and-law as it applies to
the law of torts-is the assumption that courts, in deciding who
ought to pay whom and how much after accidents, get it right-or at
least more right than alternative schemes such as we have proposed.
(In her appendix, Professor Arlen purports to buttress her thesis by
hypothesizing that "Both individuals and courts ... possess perfect
information which is costlessly obtained. Litigation and settlement
costs are assumed to be zero. As in the current system, it is assumed
that damages are paid only if an individual suffers a physical injury
and that people with identical injuries collect identical damages."98 )
As economist David Friedman tells us, the model on which most
economic analysis of accident law is premised is one in which, pur-
suant to Professor Arlen's assumptions above, courts can make and
enforce decisions, both as to levels of care and activity, relatively
effortlessly and accurately. But as Friedman stated, "When we drop
these assumptions, efficiency goes with them. So does most of the
97. Steven L. Myers, Suspensions Don't Slow Drivers: Repeat Traffic Offendeis Who Ignore
Summonses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, at 43.
98. Arlen, supra note 93, App.
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existing [economic] theory of accident law."9 9 Friedman is very pes-
simistic about how much help law-and-economics can provide acci-
dent law as long as it extrapolates from such assumptions. t'0 It
would be helpful to have Professor Arlen's further response to the
writings of economist-lawyer Gordon Tullock who has emphasized
how very costly and wasteful is tort law as applied to personal injury
in light of (a) its expensive and manipulative adversarial attempts to
prove or disprove defendant and claimant fault, (b) its likelihood of
erroneous determinations of fault, and (c) its failure to redistribute
many essential losses. Tullock goes further and criticizes how legal-
economic analysis generally fails to recognize the beneficial-and
indeed economically efficient-results flowing from reforms that
eliminate payment for non-economic losses in return for automatic
payment of economic losses.' 0 '
99. David Friedman, Book Review, 97 J. POL. ECON. 497, 499-500 (1987). David is
Milton Friedman's son.
100. Id. at 500; see Jeffrey O'Connell, Two Tier Tort Law: .Veo .Vo-Fault & Quasi Criminal
Liability, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871, 872-76 (1992).
101. Gordon Tullock, Negligence Again, I INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 52 (1981); Welfare and
Law, 2 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 151 (1982).
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